Location Privacy in Cognitive Radios with Multi-Server Private
  Information Retrieval by Grissa, Mohamed et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
02
51
8v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 3 
Ju
l 2
01
9
Location Privacy in Cognitive Radios with
Multi-Server Private Information Retrieval
Mohamed Grissa, Attila A. Yavuz, and Bechir Hamdaoui
Oregon State University, grissam,hamdaoui@oregonstate.edu
University of South Florida, attilaayavuz@usf.edu
Abstract—Spectrum database-based cognitive radio networks
(CRN s) have become the de facto approach for enabling un-
licensed secondary users (SU s) to identify spectrum vacancies
in channels owned by licensed primary users (PU s). Despite its
merits, the use of spectrum databases incurs privacy concerns for
both SU s and PU s. Single-server private information retrieval
(PIR) has been used as the main tool to address this problem.
However, such techniques incur extremely large communication
and computation overheads while offering only computational
privacy. Besides, some of these PIR protocols have been broken.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to achieve high
efficiency and (information-theoretic) privacy for both PU s and
SU s in database-driven CRN with multi-server PIR. Our key
observation is that, by design, database-driven CRN s comprise
multiple databases that are required, by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, to synchronize their records. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to exploit this observation
to harness multi-server PIR technology to guarantee an optimal
privacy for both SU s and PU s, thanks to the unique properties of
database-driven CRN . We showed, analytically and empirically
with deployments on actual cloud systems, that multi-server
PIR is an ideal tool to provide efficient location privacy in
database-driven CRN .
Index Terms—Database-driven cognitive radio networks, lo-
cation privacy, dynamic spectrum access, private information
retrieval.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of connected wireless devices has dra-
matically increased the demand for wireless spectrum and
led to a serious shortage in spectrum resources. Cognitive
radio networks (CRN s) [1] have emerged as a promising
technology for solving this shortage problem by enabling
dynamic spectrum access (DSA), which improves the spectrum
utilization efficiency by allowing unlicensed/secondary users
(SU s) to exploit unused spectrum bands (aka spectrum holes
or white spaces) of licensed/primary users (PU s).
Currently, two approaches are being adopted to identify
these white spaces: spectrum sensing and geolocation spectrum
databases. In the spectrum sensing-based approach, SU s need
to sense the PU channel to determine whether the channel is
available for opportunistic use. The spectrum database-based
approach, on the other hand, waives the sensing requirement
and instead enables SU s to query a database (DB) to learn
about spectrum opportunities in their vicinity. This approach,
already promoted and adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), was introduced as a way to overcome
the technical hurdles faced by the spectrum sensing-based
approaches, thereby enhancing the efficiency of spectrum uti-
lization, improving the accuracy of available spectrum identi-
fication, and reducing the complexity of terminal devices [2].
Moreover, it pushes the responsibility and complexity of com-
plying with spectrum policies to DB and eases the adoption of
policy changes by limiting updates to just a handful number of
databases, as opposed to updating large numbers of devices [3].
FCC has designated nine entities (e.g. Google [4], iconec-
tiv [5], and Microsoft [6]) as TV bands device database admin-
istrators which are required to follow the guidelines provided
by PAWS (Protocol to Access White Space) standard [3].
PAWS sets guidelines and operational requirements for both
the spectrum database and the SU s querying it. These include:
SU s need to be equipped with geo-location capabilities, SU s
must query DB with their specific location to check channel
availability before starting their transmissions, DB must reg-
ister SU s and manage their access to the spectrum, DB must
respond to SU s’ queries with the list of available channels in
their vicinity along with the appropriate transmission param-
eters. As specified by PAWS standard, SU s may be served
by several spectrum databases and are required to register to
one or more of these databases prior to querying them for
spectrum availability. The spectrum databases are reachable via
the Internet, and SU s querying these databases are expected
to have some form of Internet connectivity [7].
FCC has established a new service in the 3.5 GHz band,
known as Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS), in which
the spectrum is also managed through a central database-
driven CRN , aka spectrum access system (SAS ), to enable
spectrum sharing between military and federal incumbents and
SU s. A separate entity with Environmental Sensing Capability
(ESC) is responsible of populating DBs with data regarding
PU s that do not wish to reveal their operational information
such as their location or transmission characteristics. A similar
concept, named licensed shared access (LSA), for the 2.3-3.4
GHz band is also being developed in Europe to enable SU s to
opportunistically access spectrum resources in this band owned
by incumbent military aircraft services and police wireless
communications. A major difference compared to SAS, is that
in LSA, PU s are responsible for populating DBs by providing
their a priori information; i.e. their activities and, therefore the
spectrum availability information, are known upfront [8].
A. Location Privacy Issues in Database-Driven CRN s
Despite their benefits, database-driven CRN s suffer from
serious security and privacy threats. Since they could be seen
as a variant of of location based service (LBS), the disclosure
of location information of SU s represents the main threat
to SU s when it comes to obtaining spectrum availability
from DBs. The fine-grained location, when combined with
publicly available information, can easily reveal other personal
information about an individual including his/her behavior,
health condition, personal habits or even beliefs. For instance,
an adversary can learn some information about the health
condition of a user by observing that the user regularly goes
to a hospital for example. The frequency and duration of these
visits can even reveal the seriousness of a user illness and
even the type of illness if the location corresponds to that of a
specialty clinic. Matters get worse when SU s are mobile. As
per the PAWS requirements, SU s need to query DBs whenever
they change their location by at least 100 meters. This will
make SU s constantly share their location as they move which
could be exploited by a malicious service provider for tracking
purposes.
The location privacy of SU s is not the only privacy concern
that database-driven CRN s suffer from. Indeed, the location
privacy of PU s may also be critical in CRN systems such as
SAS , in the 3.5 GHz CBRS band, and LSA, in the 2.3-2.4 GHz
band, where PU s are not commercial but rather military and
governmental entities. To achieve efficient spectrum sharing
without interference to military and federal incumbents, these
systems require PU s, or entities with sensing capabilities
such as ESC, to report PU s’ operational data (including their
location, frequencies time of use, etc.) to be included in the
spectrum databases which may present serious privacy risks to
these PU s.
Being aware of such potential privacy threats, both SU s and
PU s may refuse to share their sensitive information with DBs,
which may present a serious barrier to the adoption of database-
based CRN s, and to the public acceptance and promotion of
the dynamic spectrum sharing paradigm. Therefore, there is a
critical need for developing techniques to protect the location
privacy of both PU s and SU s while allowing the latter to
harness the benefits of the CRN paradigm without disrupting
the functionalities that these techniques are designed for to
promote dynamic spectrum sharing.
B. Research Gap and Objectives
Despite the importance of the location privacy issue in
CRN s, only recently has it started to gain interest from the
research community [9]. Some works focus on addressing this
issue in the context of collaborative spectrum sensing [10]–
[14]; others address it in the context of dynamic spectrum
auction [15]. Protecting SU s’ location privacy in database-
driven CRN s is a more challenging task, merely because SU s
are required, by protocol design, to provide their physical
location to DB to learn about spectrum opportunities in their
vicinity. The heterogeneity of wireless devices and the versa-
tility of services relying on the CRN technology [16] could
also present some challenges in designing privacy-preserving
mechanisms for users in CRN s. In fact, privacy-preserving
solutions need to embrace the different resource constraints of
each SU device and the various requirements of each service
in terms of data rates and delay sensitivities. This makes it
hard to leverage general purpose public key encryption-based
techniques due to their high cost in terms of computation and
communication overheads especially on resource-constrained
devices. It is therefore crucial to design cost-effective protocols
that offer strong privacy guarantees to users and also adapt to
different systems requirements regardless of the constraints of
the users.
The existing location privacy preservation techniques for
database-driven CRN (e.g., [2], [17]–[21]) generally rely on
three main lines of privacy preserving technologies, (i) k-
anonymity [22], (ii) differential privacy [23] and (iii) single-
server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [24]. However, the
direct adaptation of k-anonymity based techniques have been
shown to yield either insecure or extremely costly results [25].
The solutions adapting differential privacy (e.g., [20]) not only
incur a non-negligible overhead, but also introduce a noise
over the queries, and therefore they may negatively impact the
accuracy of spectrum availability information.
Among these alternatives, single-server PIR seems to be the
most popular. PIR technology is a suitable choice for database-
driven CRN s, as it permits privacy preserving queries on a
public database, and therefore can enable a SU to retrieve spec-
trum availability information from the database without leaking
its location information. However, single-server PIR protocols
rely on highly costly partial homomorphic encryption schemes,
which need to be executed over the entire database for each
query. Indeed, as we also demonstrated with our experiments
in Section IV, the execution of a single query even with
some of the most efficient single-server PIR schemes [26]
takes approximately 20 seconds with a 80 Mbps/ 30Mbps
bandwidth on a moderate size database (e.g., 106 entries).
An end-to-end delay with the orders of 20 seconds might
be undesirable for spectrum sensing needs of SU s in real-
life applications. Also, some of the state-of-the-art efficient
computational PIR schemes [27] that are used in the context
of CRN s have been shown to be broken [26]. Thus, there is
a significant need for practical location privacy preservation
approaches for database-driven CRN s that can meet the effi-
ciency and functionality requirements of SU s.
C. Our Observation and Contribution
The objective of this paper is to develop efficient techniques
for database-driven CRN s that preserve the location privacy
of SU s during their process of acquiring spectrum availability
information. We also try to protect the operational privacy of
PU s in systems that require incumbents to provide spectrum
availability information to DBs. Specifically, we will aim
for the following design objectives: (i) (location privacy of
SU s) Preserve the location privacy of SU s, whether fixed or
mobile, while allowing them to receive spectrum availability
information; (ii) (efficiency and practicality) Incur minimum
computation, communication and storage overhead. The cryp-
tographic delay must be minimum to permit fast spectrum
availability decision for the SU s, and storage/processing cost
must be low to enable practical deployments. (iii) (fault-
tolerance and robustness) Mitigate the effects of system fail-
ures or misbehaving entities (e.g., colluding databases). (iv)
(location privacy of PU s) The location information of PU s
needs to be protected while still able to provide spectrum
availability information to DBs. It is very challenging to meet
all of these seemingly conflicting design goals simultaneously.
The main idea behind our proposed approaches is to harness
special properties and characteristics of the database-driven
CRN systems to employ private query techniques that can
overcome the significant performance, robustness and privacy
limitations of the state-of-the-art techniques. Specifically, our
proposed approach is based on the following observation:
Observation: FCC requires that all of its certified databases
synchronize their records obtained through registration proce-
dures with one another [28], [29] and need to be consistent
across the other databases by providing exactly the same
spectrum availability information, in any region, in response
to SU s’ queries [30]. That is, the same copy of spectrum
database is available and accessible to the SU s via multiple
(distinct) spectrum database administrators/providers. Is it
possible exploit this observation to achieve efficiency location
preservation techniques for database-driven CRN ?
In practice, as stated in PAWS standard [3], SU s have the
option to register to multiple spectrum databases belonging to
multiple service providers. Currently, many companies (e.g.
Google [4], iconectiv [5], etc) have obtained authorization
from FCC to operate geo-location spectrum databases upon
successfully complying to regulatory requirements. Several
other companies are still underway to acquire this authorization
[31]. Thus, it is more natural and realistic to take this fact into
consideration when designing privacy preserving protocols for
database-based CRN s. Based on this observation, our main
contribution is as follows:
TABLE I: Performance Comparison
Scheme Comm.
Delay
Privacy
DB SU total
LP -Chor 753KB 0.48 s 0.0077 s 0.62 s (ℓ− 1)-private
LP -Goldberg 6000KB 1.21 s 0.32 s 1.78 s t -private ℓ-comp.-private
RAID-LP -Chor 125KB 0.022 s 0.00041 s 0.21 s (π − 1)-private
PriSpectrum [2] 512.8KB 21 s 0.084 s 24.2 underlying PIR broken
Troja et al [19] 8.4KB 11760 s 5.62 s 11766 s computationally-private
Troja et al [18] 12120KB 11760 s 48 s 11820 s computationally-private
XPIR [26] 4321KB 17.66 s 0.34 s 20.53 s computationally-private
SealPIR [32] 512KB 11.03 s 0.008 s 11.35 s computationally-private
Parameters: n = 560MB, b = 560B, r = 106, ℓ = 6, w = 8, k = 6
Our Contribution: To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to exploit the fact that multiple copies of spectrum DBs are
available by nature in database-driven CRN s, and therefore
it is possible to harness multi-server PIR techniques [24],
[33] that offer information-theoretic privacy with substantial
efficiency advantages over single-server PIR. This is achieved
by relying on Shamir secret sharing-based techniques to either
divide the content of SU s’ queries or the spectrum availability
information, or both, among the different DBs to prevent these
DBs from inferring SU s’ location from their queries or from
learning PU s’ sensitive operational data from the spectrum
availability information.
We show, analytically and experimentally with deployments
on cloud systems, that our adaptation of multi-server PIR tech-
niques significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art location
privacy preservation methods as demonstrated in Table I and
detailed in Section IV. Moreover, our adaptations achieve
information theoretical privacy while existing alternatives offer
only computational privacy. This feature provides an assurance
against even post-quantum adversaries [34] and can avoid
recent attacks on computational PIR [26].
Notice that, multi-server PIR techniques require the avail-
ability of multiple (synchronized) replicas of the database.
Therefore, despite their high efficiency and security, they
received a little attention from the practitioners. For instance,
in traditional data outsourcing settings (e.g., private cloud
storage), the application requires a client to outsource only a
single copy of its database. The distribution and maintenance
of multiple copies of the database across different service
providers brings additional architectural and deployment costs,
which might not be economically attractive for the client.
In this paper, we showcased one of the first natural use-
cases of multi-server PIR, in which the multiple copies of
synchronized databases are already available by the original
design of application (i.e., spectrum availability information in
multi-database CRN s), and therefore multi-server PIR does
not introduce any extra overhead on top of the application. Ex-
ploiting this synergy between multi-database CRN and multi-
server PIR permitted us to provide informational theoretical
location privacy for SU s with a significantly better efficiency
compared to existing single-server PIR approaches.
Desirable Properties: We outline the desirable properties
of our approaches below.
• Computational efficiency: The adapted approaches are much
more efficient than existing location privacy preserving
schemes. For instance, as shown in Table I, LP -Chor and
LP -Goldberg are more than 3 orders of magnitudes faster
than the schemes proposed by Troja et al. [18], [19], and 10
times faster than XPIR [26] and PriSpectrum [2].
• Information Theoretical Privacy Guarantees: They can
achieve information-theoretic privacy which is the optimal
privacy level that could be reached as opposed to computa-
tional privacy guarantees offered by existing approaches. In
fact some of these approaches are prone to recent attacks on
computational-PIR protocols [26] and are not secure against
post-quantum adversaries [34].
• Low communication overhead: Our approaches incur a rea-
sonable communication overhead that is a middle ground
between the fastest computational PIR [26] and the most
communication efficient computational PIR [35].
• Fault-Tolerance and Robustness: Our proposed approaches
are resilient to the issues that are associated with multi-server
architectures: failures, byzantine behavior, and collusion.
Even though the collusion of all of the service providers
is unlikely to happen due to the competing nature of these
companies and due to regulatory enforcement from bod-
ies such as FCC to protect users data, we have however
considered collusion in our system and security model. All
proposed approaches can handle collusion of multiple DBs
up to certain limit that is different for each approach. In
addition, some of the proposed approaches can also handle
faulty and byzantine DBs. Besides, simply hacking DBs,
when the proposed approaches are in place, will not be
sufficient to learn users’ information since some of these
protocols offer hybrid privacy protection by combining both
computational and information-theoretic PIR protocols en-
abling them to offer computational privacy even when all of
the DBs are compromised.
• Experimental evaluation on actual cloud platforms: We
deploy our proposed approaches on a real cloud platform,
GENI [36], to show their feasibility. In our experiment, we
create multiple geographically distributed VMs each playing
the role of a DB . A laptop plays the role of a SU that queries
DBs, i.e. VM s. Our experiments confirm the superior
computational advantages of the adoption of multi-server
PIR over the existing alternatives.
D. Differences Compared to the Preliminary Version
The main differences between this paper and its preliminary
versions [37], [38] are as follows: (i) We further consider
the location privacy issue of mobile SU s and offer a way to
amortize the cost incurred by mobility. (ii) We also leverage
multi-server PIR to address the location privacy issue of
PU s in database-CRN systems that require PU s to provide
spectrum availability to DBs. (iii) We discuss also a way
to reduce the cost of LP -Chor by partitioning the spectrum
database instead of simply replicating it using the RAID-
PIR protocol [39] and we discuss the privacy-performance
tradeoff of relying on such approach. (iv) We provide a more
detailed performance evaluation that takes into account the
latest advances in PIR technology, namely SealPIR [32] which
relies on fully homomorphic encryption.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND MODELS
A. Notation and Building Blocks
We summarize our notations in Table II. Our adaptations of
multi-server PIR rely on the following building blocks.
TABLE II: Notations
DB Spectrum database
SU Secondary user
CRN Cognitive radio network
ℓ Number of spectrum databases
D Matrix modeling the content of DB
r Number of records in D
n Size of the database in bits
b Size of one record of the database in bits
w Size of one word of the database in bits
s Number of words per block
β Index of the record sought by SU
t Privacy level (tolerated number of colluding DBs)
k Number of responding DBs
ϑ Number of byzantine DBs
Private Information Retrieval (PIR): PIR allows a user
to retrieve a data item of its choice from a database, while
preventing the server owning the database from gaining in-
formation on the identity of the item being retrieved [40].
One trivial solution to this problem is to make the server
send an entire copy of the database to the querying user.
Obviously, this is a very inefficient solution to the PIR problem
as its communication complexity may be prohibitively large.
However, it is considered as the only protocol that can provide
information-theoretic privacy, i.e. perfect privacy, to the user’s
query in single-server setting. There are two main classes of
PIR protocols according to their privacy level: information-
theoretic PIR (itPIR) and computational PIR (cPIR).
• Information-theoretic or multi-server PIR: It guarantees
information-theoretic privacy to the user, i.e. privacy against
computationally unbounded servers. This could be achieved
efficiently only if the database is replicated at k ≥ 2 non-
communicating servers [24], [33]. The main idea behind
these protocols consists on decomposing each user’s query
into several sub-queries to prevent leaking any information
about the user’s intent.
• Computational or single-server PIR: It guarantees privacy
against computationally bounded server(s). In other words,
a server cannot get any information about the identity of the
item retrieved by the user unless it solves a certain com-
putationally hard problem (e.g. prime factorization of large
numbers), which is common in modern cryptography. Thus,
they offer weaker privacy than their itPIR counterparts [27],
[41].
Shamir Secret Sharing: This is a concept introduced by
Shamir et al. [42] to allow a secret holder to divide its secret
S into ℓ shares S1, · · · ,Sℓ and distribute these shares to
ℓ parties. In (t , ℓ)-Shamir secret sharing, where t < ℓ, if t or
fewer combine their shares, they learn no information about
S. However, if more than t come together, they can easily
recover S. Given a secret S chosen arbitrarily form a finite
field, the (t , ℓ)-Shamir secret sharing scheme works as follows:
the secret holder chooses ℓ arbitrary non-zero distinct elements
α1, · · · , αℓ ∈ F. Then, it selects t elements σ1, · · · , σt ∈ F
uniformly at random. Finally, the secret holder constructs the
polynomial f(x) = σ0 + σ1x + σ2x
2 + · · · + σtxt, where
σ0 = S. The ℓ shares S1, · · · ,Sℓ, that are given to each party,
are (α1, f(α1)), · · · , (αℓ, f(αℓ)). Any t + 1 or more parties
can recover the polynomial f using Lagrange interpolation and
thus they can reconstruct the secret S = f(0). However, t or
less parties can learn nothing about S. In other words, if t +1
shares of S are available then S can be easily recovered.
B. System Model and Security Definitions
We consider a database-driven CRN that contains ℓ DBs,
where ℓ ≥ 2, and a SU registered to these DBs to learn
spectrum availability information in its vicinity. We assume
that these DBs share the same content and that they are
synchronized as mandated by PAWS standard [3]. We also
assume that DBs may collude in order to infer SU ’s location.
In the following, we present our security definitions.
Definition 1. Byzantine DB: This is a faulty DB that runs
but produces incorrect answers, possibly chosen maliciously or
computed in error. This might be due to a corrupted or obsolete
copy of the database caused by a synchronization problem with
the other DBs.
Definition 2. t-private PIR: The privacy of the query is
information-theoretically protected, even if up to t of the ℓ DBs
collude, where 0 < t < ℓ.
Definition 3. ϑ-Byzantine-robust PIR: Even if ϑ of the
respondingDBs are Byzantine, SU can reconstruct the correct
database item, and determine which of the DBs provided
incorrect response.
Definition 4. k -out-of-ℓ PIR: SU can reconstruct the correct
record if it receives at least k -out-of-ℓ responses, 2 ≤ k ≤ ℓ.
Definition 5. Robust PIR: It can deal with DBs that do not
respond to SU ’s queries and allows SU to reconstruct the
correct output of the queries in this situation.
Definition 6. τ -independent PIR: The content of the database
itself is information theoretically protected from the coalition
of up to τ DBs, where 0 ≤ τ < k − t .
III. PROPOSED APPROACHES
In the proposed approaches, we tailor multi-server PIR to
the context of multi-DB CRN s. We start by illustrating the
structure of the spectrum database that we consider. Then, we
give several approaches, each adapts a multi-server PIR pro-
tocol with different security, performance properties, and use
cases. We model the content of each DB as an r × s matrix
D of size n bits, where s is the number of words of size
w in each record/block of the database and r is the number of
records in the database, i.e. r = n/b, where b = s × w is the
block size in bits. The kth row of D is the kth record of the
database.
D =


w11 w12 . . . w1s
w21 w22 . . . w2s
...
...
. . .
...
w r1 w r2 . . . w rs


We further assume that each row of the database corresponds to
a unique combination of the tuple (lx , ly ,C , ts), where lx and
ly represent one location’s latitude and longitude, respectively,
C is a channel number, and ts is a time-stamp. We also assume
that SU s can associate their location information with the
index β of the corresponding record of interest in the database
using some inverted index technique that is agreed upon with
DBs. An SU that wishes to retrieve record Dβ without any
privacy consideration can simply send to DB a row vector
eβ consisting of all zeros except at position β where it has
the value 1. Upon receiving eβ , DB multiplies it with D and
sends record Dβ back to SU as we illustrate below:
[
0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0
]


w11 w12 . . . w1s
w21 w22 . . . w2s
...
...
. . .
...
w r1 w r2 . . . w rs


=
[
wβ1 wβ2 . . . wβs
]
This trivial approach makes it easy for DBs to learn SU ’s
location from the vector eβ as D is indexed based on location.
In the following we present two approaches that try to hide
the content of eβ from DBs, and thus preserve SU ’s location
privacy. The approaches present a tradeoff between efficiency,
and some additional security features.
A. Location Privacy with Chor (LP -Chor )
Our first approach, termed LP -Chor , harnesses the simple
and efficient itPIR protocol proposed by Chor et al. [24]. We
describe the different steps of LP -Chor in Algorithm 1 and
highlight these steps in Fig. 1. Elements of D in this scheme
belong to GF (2), i.e. w = 1 bit and b = s .
In LP -Chor , SU starts by invoking the inverted index
subroutine InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts) which takes as input the
Fig. 1: Main steps of LP -Chor Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Dβ ←LP -Chor (ℓ, r , b)
SU
1: β ← InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts)
2: Sets standard basis vector eβ ← −→1 β ∈ Zr
3: Generates ρ1, · · · ,ρℓ−1 ∈R GF (2)r
4: ρℓ ← ρ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eβ
5: Sends ρi to DB i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
Each DB i
6: Receives ρi = ρi1 · · ·ρir ∈ {0, 1}r
7: Ri ←
⊕
1≤j≤r
ρij=1
Dj , Dj is the j
th block of D
8: Sends Ri to SU
SU
9: Receives R1, · · · ,Rℓ
10: Dβ ← R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rℓ
coordinates of the user, its channel of interest, and a time-
stamp and returns a value β. This value corresponds to the
index of the recordDβ of D that SU is interested in. SU then
constructs eβ , which is a standard basis vector
−→
1 β ∈ Zr
having 0 everywhere except at position β which has the
value 1 as we discussed previously. SU also picks ℓ − 1
r -bit binary strings ρ1, · · · ,ρℓ−1 uniformly at random from
GF (2)r , and computes ρℓ = ρ1⊕· · ·⊕eβ . Finally, SU sends
ρi to DB i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Upon receiving the bit-string
ρi = ρi1 ⊕ · · ·ρir of length r , DB i computes Ri = ρi ·D ,
which could be seen also as the XOR of those blocks Dj in
D for which the jth bit of ρi is 1, then sends Ri back to
SU . SU receives Ris from DB is, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and computes
R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rℓ = (ρ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ρℓ) ·D = eβ ·D , which is the
βth block of the database that SU is interested in, from which
it can retrieve the spectrum availability information.
LP -Chor is very efficient thanks to its reliance on simple
XOR operations only as we discuss in Section IV. It is also
(ℓ−1)-private, by Definition 2, as collusion of up to ℓ−1 DBs
cannot enable them to learn eβ , and consequently its location.
In fact, only if ℓ DBs collude, then they will be able to learn
eβ by simply XORing their {ρi}ℓi=1. However this approach
suffers from two main drawbacks. First, it is not robust since
even if one DB fails to respond, SU will not be able to recover
Dβ . Second, it is not byzantine robust; if one or more DBs
return a wrong response, SU will reconstruct a wrong block
and also will not be able to recognize which DB misbehaved
so as not to rely on it for future queries. In Section III-B we
discuss a second approach that improves on these two aspects
but with some additional overhead.
B. Location Privacy with Goldberg (LP -Goldberg)
Our second approach, termed LP -Goldberg , is based on
Goldberg’s itPIR protocol [33] which uses Shamir secret
sharing to hide eβ , i.e. SU ’s query. It is a modification of
Chor’s scheme [24] to achieve both robustness and byzantine
robustness. Rather than working over GF (2) (binary arith-
metic), this scheme works over a larger field F, where each
element can represent w bits. The databaseD = (w jk) ∈ Fr×s
in this scheme, is an r×s matrix of elements of F = GF (2w).
Each row represents one block of size b bits, consisting of s
words of w bits each. Again,D is replicated among ℓ databases
DB i. We summarize the main steps of LP -Goldberg protocol
in Algorithm 2 and illustrate them in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Illustration of LP -Goldberg
To determine the index β of the record that corre-
sponds to its location, SU starts by invoking the subroutine
InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts) then constructs the standard basis vec-
tor eβ ∈ Fr as explained earlier. SU then uses (ℓ, t)-Shamir
secret sharing to divide the vector eβ into ℓ independent shares
(α1, ,ρ1) · · · , (αℓ,ρℓ) to ensure a t -private PIR protocol as in
Definition 2. That is, SU chooses ℓ distinct non-zero elements
αi ∈ F∗ and creates r random degree-t polynomials f1, · · · , fr
satisfying fj(0) = eβ [j]. SU then sends to each DB i its
share corresponding to the vector ρi = 〈f1(αi), · · · , fr(αi)〉.
Each DB i then computes the product Ri = ρi · D =
〈∑j fj(αi)w j1, · · · ,
∑
j fj(αi)w js〉 ∈ Fs and sends Ri to
SU .
Some DBs may fail to respond to SU ’s query and only k -
out-of-ℓ send their responses to SU . SU collects k responses
from the k responding DBs and tries to recover the record
at index β from the Ris by using the EASYRECOVER()
subroutine from [33] which uses Lagrange interpolation to
recover Dβ from the secret shares (α1,R1), · · · , (αk ,Rk ).
This is possible thanks to the use of (ℓ, t)-Shamir secret sharing
as long as k > t and these k DBs are honest. In fact, by the
linearity property of Shamir secret sharing, since {(αi,ρi)}ℓi=1
is a set of (ℓ, t)-Shamir secret shares of eβ , then {(αi,Ri)}ℓi=1
will be also a set of (ℓ, t)-Shamir secret shares of eβ · D ,
which is the βth block of the database. Thus, it is possible
for SU to reconstruct Dβ using Lagrange interpolation as
explained in Section II, by relying only on the k responses
which makes LP -Goldberg robust by Definition 5. Also, the
EASYRECOVER can detect the DBs that responded honestly,
thus those that are byzantine as well, which should discourage
DBs from misbehaving. More details about this subroutine
could be found in [33].
Algorithm 2 Dβ ← LP -Goldberg(ℓ, r , b, t ,w)
SU
1: β ← InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts)
2: Sets standard basis vector eβ ← −→1 β ∈ Zr
3: Chooses ℓ distinct α1, · · · , αℓ ∈ F∗
4: Creates r random degree-t polynomials f1, · · · , fr ∈R
F[x] s.t. fj(0) = eβ[j]’ ∀j ∈ [1, · · · , r ]
5: ρi ← 〈f1(αi), · · · , fr(αi)〉, ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ]
6: Sends ρi to DB i, ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ]
Each honest DB i
7: Receives ρi
8: Ri ← ρi ·D = 〈
∑
j fj(αi)wj1, · · · ,
∑
j fj(αi)wjs〉
9: Sends Ri to SU
SU
10: Receives R1, · · · ,Rk
11: if k > t then
12: for c from 1 to s do
13: Ric ← Ri[c] ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , k ]
14: S c ← 〈R1c, · · · ,Rkc〉
15: Dβc ← EASYRECOVER(t ,w , [α1, · · · , αk ], S c)
16: if Recovery fails and ϑ < k − ⌊
√
kt⌋ then
17: S c ← 〈R1c, · · · ,Rkc〉
18: Dβc ← HARDRECOVER(t ,w , [α1, · · · , αk ], S c)
Moreover, ϑ DBs among the k responding ones may even be
byzantine, as in Definition 1, and produce incorrect response.
In that case, it would be impossible for SU to simply rely on
Lagrange interpolation to recover the correct responses. Since
Shamir secret sharing is based on polynomial interpolation,
the problem of recovering the response in the case of byzantine
failures corresponds to noisy polynomial reconstruction, which
is exactly the problem of decoding Reed-Solomon codes [43].
Thus, SU would rather rely on error correction codes and more
precisely on the Guruswami-Sudan list decoding [44] algorithm
which can correct ϑ < k −⌊
√
kt⌋ incorrect responses. In fact,
the vector 〈R1[q],R2[q], · · · ,Rℓ[q]〉 is a Reed-Solomon code-
word encoding the polynomial gq =
∑
j fjw jq , and the client
wishes to compute gq(0) for each 1 ≤ q ≤ s to recover all the
s words forming the record Dβ = 〈g1(0), · · · , gs(0)〉. This is
done through the HARDRECOVER() subroutine from [33]. This
makes LP -Goldberg also ϑ-Byzantine-robust, by Definition 3,
and solves the robustness issues that LP -Chor suffers from,
however, this comes at the cost of an additional overhead as
we discuss in Section IV.
Corollary 1. LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg directly inherit the
security properties of Chor’s [24] PIR and Goldberg’s [33]
PIR respectively.
C. Location Privacy of Mobile SU s Through Batching
Thus far, we concerned only about non-mobile SU s that pe-
riodically submit an individual query to DBs to learn spectrum
availability in their fixed location. However, things get more
interesting with mobility. In fact, a mobile SU will need to
query DBs multiple times as its location changes. While the
previous two approaches perform well for non-mobile SU s,
they will incur a significant overhead on both SU and DBs
especially when SU is moving at a relatively high speed, which
will require a large number of PIR queries.
Our third approach aims to protect the location privacy of
mobile SU s while reducing the mobility-associated overhead.
The idea is to exploit the fact that a mobile SU usually has
an a priori knowledge of its trajectory to make it query DBs
for its current and future locations by batching these queries
together instead of sending them separately. We achieve this
by relying on the itPIR protocol of Lueks et al. [45] that
extends the scheme of Goldberg [33] to support batching
of the queries using fast matrix multplication mechanisms
inspired from batch codes [46]. We refer to this approach as
LP -BatchPIR and we describe it in the following.
Each DB i that receives q simultaneous queries
ρ
(1)
i , · · · ,ρ(q)i from an SU can process them using
LP -Goldberg by simply multiplying each query with
D as illustrated in Step 8 of Algorithm 2. Alternatively, it can
also group these queries into a matrix Qi of size q × r , where
each row j corresponds to a query ρ
(j)
i , before computing
the matrix product Q i · D . The careful reader will notice
that this naive multiplication method would cost around 2qrs
operations (including multiplications and additions) which can
be prohibitively expensive especially for a large D or q . This
problem boils down to a fast matrix multiplication problem
and therefore can benefit from fast matrix multiplication
algorithms such as Strassen’s [47].
Strassen’s algorithm consists on simply dividing both matri-
ces Qi and D into four equally sized block matrices. Then
instead of naively multiplying these submatrices, which will
result in 8 submatrix multiplications (fundamentally equivalent
to simple matrix multiplication), Strassen’s algorithm creates
linear combinations of blocks in a way that reduces the number
of submatrix multiplications to 7. The exact approach is then
applied recursively to the multiplications of the submatrices of
the previous step. This simple yet powerful matrix multiplica-
tion technique will significantly reduce the overhead for DBs
and therefore the delay that SU s experience to learn spectrum
availability while moving as illustrated in Section IV.
A row j in the resulting matrix, Ri = Q i ·D , corresponds
to DB i’s response to the j
th query. SU will then recover the
spectrum availability by combining same-index rows of the
different Ris as in LP -Goldberg .
D. Location Privacy of PU s
As we mentioned earlier, in database-driven CRN s, DBs’
content comprises operational information of PU s which may
be very sensitive in systems such as SAS in the 3.5 GHz
CBRS band where PU s are military and governmental entities.
The service providers use this operational data to feed their
models and populate the spectrum databases with availability
information but do not share the PU s’ location information
in response to SU s’ queries. Therefore, SU s do not present
a serious threat to PU s privacy as opposed to the service
providers which could be malicious, and could misuse PU s’
sensitive operational data.
In this subsection, we present another approach to take into
account the privacy of these PU s as well. For this we make
use of another extension of the Goldberg PIR scheme known
as τ -independence, to prevent DBs from learning the content
of D even if up to τ DBs collude to learn D as defined
in Definition 6. This is achieved by making PU s populate
the DBs with spectrum availability information pertaining
to their respective channels instead of the service providers,
by secretly sharing each record they want to add, among
the different service providers using Shamir secret sharing
techniques, similar to how SU s secretly share their queries.
That way, each service provider will not be able to decode this
data, and only SU s which have access to the secret can retrieve
the record by combining the different shares from the different
DBs. This is motivated by the fact that DBs are expected to
be populated by PU s themselves as it is the case in LSA
systems, or by a highly trusted independent entity, the ESC, as
in SAS systems. Therefore, whenever a PU or an ESC submits
a PU activity record of index j to DBs it will divide it into
s words Wj1, · · · ,Wjs and distributes Shamir secret shares of
every word among the ℓ DBs as reflected in Algorithm 3. Each
DB i will now have a different content D
(i):
D(i) =


w
(i)
11 w
(i)
12 . . . w
(i)
1s
w
(i)
21 w
(i)
22 . . . w
(i)
2s
...
...
. . .
...
w
(i)
r1 w
(i)
r2 . . . w
(i)
rs


where {w (i)jc }1≤i≤ℓ form a (τ, ℓ)-Shamir secret sharing of
word Wjc. This requires that the random values αis, used to
create Shamir secret shares as explained in Section II-A, are
shared beforehand among SU s and PU s. This could be done
by FCC during the registration phase, for instance, and must
not be communicated to DBs.
This way, records revealing operational data of PU s, which
could be used by DBs to build knowledge of the activity
of these PU s and track them, are information-theoretically
protected from DBs as long as no more than τ of these DBs
collude. However, for this protocol to work, this condition must
hold: 0 < t ≤ t + τ < k ≤ ℓ. While this extension of
LP -Goldberg should have no impact on the performance from
SU s and DBs side as we show in Section IV, it has, however,
an impact on the t-privacy of the protocol. In fact as the τ -
independence level, controlling how many DBs can collude to
learn the record submitted by PU , sought by PU increases,
the maximum achievable t-privacy level will decrease since
t + τ < k must always hold.
E. Location Privacy of SU s in Partitioned-database CRN s
In this section, we present another location privacy-
preserving approach for SU s in the case where the spectrum
database content is distributed among the different DBs instead
of simply replicating it as in the previous approaches. This
Algorithm 3 Dβ ← τ -LP -Goldberg(ℓ, r , b, t ,w)
FCC
1: Chooses ℓ distinct α1, · · · , αℓ ∈ F∗.
2: Shares these αis only with PU s and SU s.
PU
3: Divides its activity record j into s words Wj1, · · · ,Wjs
4: Creates s random degree-τ polynomials gj1, · · · , gjs ∈R
F[x] s.t. gjc(0) = Wjc ∀c ∈ [1, · · · , s ]
5: Sends w
(i)
jc ← gjc(αi) to DB i, ∀ i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ], ∀c ∈
[1, · · · , s ]
6: DB i adds j
th record formed by w
(i)
j1 , · · · ,w (i)js to D(i)
SU
7: β ← InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts)
8: Sets standard basis vector eβ ← −→1 β ∈ Zr
9: Creates r random degree-t polynomials f1, · · · , fr ∈R
F[x] s.t. fj(0) = eβ [j] ∀j ∈ [1, · · · , r ]
10: ρi ← 〈f1(αi), · · · , fr(αi)〉, ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ]
11: Sends ρi to DB i, ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ]
Each honest DB i
12: Receives ρi
13: Ri ← ρi ·D(i) = 〈
∑
j fj(αi)w
(i)
j1 , · · · ,
∑
j fj(αi)w
(i)
js 〉
14: Sends Ri to SU
SU
15: Receives R1, · · · ,Rk
16: if k > t + τ then
17: for c from 1 to s do
18: Ric ← Ri[c] ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , k ]
19: S c ← 〈R1c, · · · ,Rkc〉
20: Dβc ← EASYRECOVER(t ,w , [α1, · · · , αk ], S c)
21: if Recovery fails and ϑ < k − ⌊
√
k(t + τ)⌋ then
22: S c ← 〈R1c, · · · ,Rkc〉
23: Dβc ← HARDRECOVER(t ,w , [α1, · · · , αk ], S c)
could be motivated by the fact that some database-driven
CRN s may have multiple DBs covering different or slightly
overlapping regions. It could also be a way to reduce cost by
making each DB manage a portion of the database.
For that we rely on the RAID-PIR protocol due to Demmler
et al. [39] which builds on Chor’s scheme to reduce the
communication overhead and the computation required at the
server side. The idea here is very similar to that of Chor’s but
here the vector eβ is divided into ℓ chunks. Each query qi sent
to DB i is divided into π chunks as illustrated in Figure 3,
where π is a redundancy parameter that controls the minimum
number of DBs that need to collude to recover the record Dβ
with 2 ≤ π ≤ ℓ. This parameter also controls the number
of chunks in every query and how often the chunks overlap
throughout these queries [39].
The details of this approach are described in Algorithm 4.
To optimize the cost, SU can use a pseudo random generator,
PRG, to generate the π − 1 chunks of qi as illustrated
in Algorithm 4. For that, SU randomly generates ℓ seeds
s1, · · · , sℓ of size κ bits each, where κ is the symmetric
Fig. 3: RAID-PIR [39]
security parameter, and expands each seed si into π−1 random
chunks rndi[j], using PRG, each of size
r
ℓ as depicted in
step 4 of Algorithm 4. The first chunk of query qi, denoted as
fi, is computed to cancel out the π−1 other ith chunks rndi[j]
of each of the other DBs, if applicable, and is obtained by
xoring those π−1 chunks with the ith chunk of eβ . Thanks to
the use of the PRG, SU does not need to send the whole query
and needs only to send a compacted version of qi, denoted as
q′i, composed of fi and the seed si, used to generate the other
chunks of the full query qi, to DB i. Then, DB i will use the
same pseudo-random generator, PRG, with the seed that it
received to generate the full query qi. Once qi recovered, DB i
will construct its answer Ri by xoring the records in D whose
indices match those of the set bits in qi. Finally, SU needs only
to xor the results from the different DBs to recover the βth
record.
Algorithm 4 Dβ ← RAID-LP -Chor (ℓ, r , b)
SU
1: β ← InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts)
2: Sets standard basis vector eβ ← −→1 β ∈ Zr
3: Picks ℓ seeds si ∈R {0, 1}κ
4: Expands si to π − 1 chunks rndi[j] ← PRG(si, j) ∀j ∈
[(i mod ℓ) + 1, (i+ π − 2 mod ℓ) + 1], ∀i ∈ [1, ℓ]
5: fi ←
⊕
j rndj [i], j = (i − 1 mod ℓ) + 1, (i − 2 mod ℓ+
1), · · ·
6: fi ← eβ ⊕ fi ∀i ∈ [1, ℓ]
7: Sends q′i consisting of chunk fi and seed si to DB i
Each DB i
8: Expands its received si as in Step 4 to get full query qi
9: Ri ←
⊕
1≤j≤r
qij=1
Dj , Dj is the j
th record of D
10: Sends Ri to SU
SU
11: Receives R1, · · · ,Rℓ
12: Dβ ← R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rℓ
As the size of the query qi is just π/ℓ · r , each DB now
needs to store and process only π/ℓ · r records of D which
will be beneficial to DBs especially if the number of these
databases increases.
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. Analytical Comparison
We start by studying the proposed approaches’ performance
analytically and we compare them to existing approaches. For
LP -Goldberg , we choose w = 8 to simplify the cost of
computations as in [43]; since in GF (28), additions are XOR
operations on bytes and multiplications are lookup operations
into a 64 KB table [43]. We summarize the system communica-
tion complexity and the computation incurred by both DB and
SU and we illustrate the difference in architecture and privacy
level of the different approaches in Table III. As we mentioned
earlier, existing research focuses on the single DB setting.
We compare the proposed approaches to existent techniques
despite the difference of architecture to show the great benefits
that multi-server PIR brings in terms of performance and
privacy as we discuss next. We briefly discuss these approaches
in the following.
Gao et al. [2] propose a PIR-based approach, termed
PriSpectrum, that relies on the PIR scheme of Trostle et
al. [27] to defend against the new attack that they identify.
This new attack exploits spectrum utilization pattern to localize
SU s. Troja et al. [18], [19] propose two other PIR-based
approaches that try to minimize the number of PIR queries
by either allowing SU s to share their availability information
with other SU s [18] or by exploiting trajectory information
to make SU s retrieve information for their current and future
positions in the same query [19].
Despite their merit in providing location privacy to SU s
these PIR-based approaches incur high overhead especially
in terms of computation. This is due to the fact that they
rely on cPIR protocols to provide location privacy to SU s,
which are known to suffer from expensive computational cost.
In fact, answering an SU ’s query through a cPIR protocol,
requires DB to process all of its records, otherwise DB would
learn that SU is not interested in them and would then learn
partial information about the record Dβ , and consequently
SU ’s location. This makes the computational cost of most
cPIR based location preserving schemes linear on the database
size from DB side as we illustrate in Table III. Now this is
not exclusive to cPIR protocols as even itPIR protocols may
require processing all the records to guarantee privacy, how-
ever, the main difference with cPIR protocols is that the latter
have a very large cost per bit in the database, usually involving
expensive group operations like multiplication modulo a large
modulus [26] as opposed to multi-server itPIR protocols. This
could be seen clearly in Table III as both LP -Chor and
LP -Goldberg require DB to perform a very efficient XOR
operation per bit of the database. The same applies to the over-
head incurred by SU which only performs XOR operations in
both LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg , while performing expensive
modular multiplications and even exponentiations over large
primes in the cPIR-based approaches.
In terms of communication overhead, the proposed ap-
proaches incur a cost that is linear in the number of records
r and their size b. As an optimal choice of these parameters
is usually r = b =
√
n [24], [26], [33], [43] then this cost
could be seen as O(√nw ) to retrieve a record of size √nw
bits, which is a reasonable cost for an information theoretic
privacy.
Moreover, as illustrated in Table III, existent approaches
fail to provide information theoretic privacy as the underly-
ing security relies on computational PIR schemes. The only
approaches that provide information theoretic location privacy
are LP -Chor , LP -Goldberg , and RAID-LP -Chor which are
(ℓ− 1)-private, t -private, and (π − 1)-private respectively, by
Definition 2. It is worth mentioning that PriSpectrum [2]
relies on the well-known cPIR of Trostle et al. [27] repre-
senting the state-of-the-art in efficient cPIR. However, this
cPIR scheme has been broken [26], [48]. Since the security of
PriSpectrum follows that of Trostle et al. [27] broken cPIR,
then PriSpectrum fails to provide the privacy objective that it
was designed for. However, we include it in our performance
analysis for completeness.
B. Experimental Evaluation
We further evaluate the performance of the proposed
schemes experimentally to confirm the analytical observations.
Hardware setting and configuration. We have deployed the
proposed approaches on GENI [36] cloud platform using the
percy++ library [49]. We have created 6 virtual machines
(VMs), each playing the role of a DB and they all share the
same copy of D . We deploy these GENI VMs in different
locations in the US to count for the network delay and make
our experiment closer to the real case scenario where spectrum
service providers are located in different locations. These VMs
are running Ubuntu 14.04, each having 8 GB of RAM, 15
GB SSD, and 4 vCPUs, Intel Xeon X5650 2.67 GHz or
Intel Xeon E5-2450 2.10 GHz. To assess the SU overhead
we use a Lenovo Yoga 3 Pro laptop with 8 GB RAM running
Ubuntu 16.10 with an Intel Core m Processor 5Y70 CPU 1.10
GHz. The client laptop communicates with the remote VMs
through ssh tunnels. We are also aware of the advances in
cPIR technology, and more precisely the fastest cPIR pro-
tocols in the literature: XPIR which is proposed by Aguilar
et al. [26] and SealPIR due to Angel et al. [32]. We include
these protocols in our experiment to illustrate how multi-server
PIR performs against the best known cPIR schemes if they are
to be deployed in CRN s. We use the available implementation
of these protocols provided in [50] and [51] and we deploy their
server components on a remote GENI VM while the client
component is deployed on the Lenovo Yoga 3 Pro laptop.
Dataset. Spectrum service providers (e.g. Google, Microsoft,
etc) offer graphical web interfaces and APIs to interact with
their databases allowing to retrieve basic spectrum availability
information for a user-specified location. Access to full data
from real spectrum databases was not possible, thus, we
generated random data for our experiment. The generated data
consists of a matrix that models the content of the database,D ,
with a fixed block size b = 560 B while varying the number
of records r . The value of b is estimated based on the public
raw data provided by FCC [52] on a daily basis and which
service providers use to populate their spectrum databases.
Results and Comparison. We first measure the query end-to-
end delay of the proposed approaches and plot the results in
Fig. 4. We also include the delay introduced by the existing
schemes based on our estimation of the operations included
TABLE III: Comparison with existent schemes
Scheme Communication
Computation
Setting Privacy
DB SU
LP -Chor (r + b) · ℓ nt⊕ (r + b) · ((ℓ − 1) · t⊕) ℓ DBs (ℓ − 1)-private
LP -Goldberg r · w · ℓ+ k · b (n/w) · t⊕ ℓ · (ℓ− 1) · r t⊕ + 3ℓ · (ℓ+ 1)t⊕ ℓ DBs t -private ℓ-comp.-private
RAID-LP -Chor r + ℓ · κ+ ℓ · b (π/ℓ) · nt⊕ (r · (π − 1) + b · (ℓ− 1))t⊕ ℓ DB (π − 1)-private
PriSpectrum [2] (2
√
r + 3) · ⌈log p⌉ O(r) ·Mulp 4√r ·Mulp 1 DB underlying PIR broken
Troja et al [19] 12δ · b O(n) ·Mulp 4√n ·Mulp 1 DB computationally-private
Troja et al [18] ng · ψ · log2 q + (2
√
n + 3) · ⌈log p⌉ O(n) ·Mulp ng · ψ · (2Expp+Mulp) + 4
√
n ·Mulp 1 DB computationally-private
XPIR [26] O(Nd d√n) 2d · (r/α) · (b/ℓ0) ·Mulp d · (r/α)1/d · Enc+ d · α · b/ℓ0 ·Dec 1 DB computationally-private
SealPIR [32] O(Nd⌈ d√n/N⌉) O(d d√n) d · E + (F d−1 + 1) · D 1 DB computationally-private
Variables: t⊕ is the execution time of one XOR operation. p is a large prime, and Mulp and Expp are the execution time of performing one modular multiplication, and one
modular exponentiation respectively. ψ denotes the number of bits that an SU shares with other SU s in [18], ng is the number of SU s within a same group in [18]. δ is the
number of DB segments in [19]. d is the recursion level, α is the aggregation level, C is the Ring-LWE ciphertext size, λ is the number of elements returned by DB , F is the
expansion factor of the underlying cryptosystem, ℓ0 is the number of bits absorbed in a cyphertext, all are used in [26]. (Enc,Dec) are respectively the encryption and decryption
cost for Ring-LWE cryptosystem used in [26]. (E,D) are respectively the encryption and decryption cost for Fan-Vercauteren [53] cryptosystem used in [32]. N is the query size
bound in XPIR and SealPIR and is typically is typically 2048 or 4096 based on recommended security parameters.
in Table III. The end-to-end delay that we measure takes into
consideration the time needed by SU to generate the query,
the network delay, the time needed by DB to process the
query, and finally the time needed by SU to extract the βth
record of the database. We consider two different internet speed
configurations in our experiment. We first rely on a high-
speed internet connection of 80Mbps on the download and
30Mbps on the upload for all compared approaches. Then
we use a low-speed internet connection of 1Mbps on the
upload and download to assess the impact of the bandwidth
on LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg , and also on XPIR as well.
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Fig. 4: Query RTT of the different PIR-based approaches
Fig. 4 shows that the proposed schemes perform much better
than the existing approaches in terms of delay even with
low-speed internet connection. They also perform better than
the fastest existing cPIR protocols XPIR and SealPIR. This
shows the benefit of relying on multi-server itPIR in multi-
DB CRN s. Also, and as expected, LP -Chor scheme performs
better than LP -Goldberg thanks to its simplicity. As we will
see later, LP -Goldberg also incurs larger communication over-
head than LP -Chor as well. This could be acceptable knowing
that LP -Goldberg can handle collusion of up-to ℓ DBs, and
is robust in the case of (ℓ − k) non-responding DBs, and
ϑ byzantine DBs, as opposed to LP -Chor . This means that
LP -Goldberg could be more suitable to real world scenario as
failures and byzantine behaviors are common in reality. Fig. 4
also shows that the network bandwidth has a significant impact
on the end-to-end latency. This is due to the relatively large
amount of data that needs to be exchanged during the execution
of these protocols which requires higher internet speeds.
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Fig. 5: Computation Comparison
We also compare the computational complexity experienced
by each SU and DB separately in the different approaches
as shown in Table III. We further illustrate this through
experimentation and we plot the results in Fig. 5a, which
shows that the proposed schemes incur lower overhead on
the SU than the existing approaches. The same observation
applies to the computation experienced by each DB which
again involves only efficient XOR operations in the proposed
schemes. We illustrate this in Fig. 5b.
We also study the impact of non-responding DBs on the
end-to-end delay experienced by the SU in LP -Goldberg as
illustrated in Fig. 6. This Figure shows that as the number
of faulty DBs increases, the end-to-end delay decreases since
SU needs to process fewer shares to recover the record
Dβ . As opposed to LP -Chor , in LP -Goldberg , SU is still
able to recover the record β even if only k out-of-ℓ DBs
respond. Please recall also that our experiment was performed
on resource constrained VMs to emulate DBs, however in
reality, DBs should have much more powerful computational
resources than those of the used VMs which will have a
tremendous impact on further reducing the overhead of the
proposed approaches.
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Fig. 7: Impact of increasing query privacy level, t
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of SU ’s desired privacy level
in LP -Goldberg on the processing time incurred by both
SU and DBs. As expected, increasing the value of t , which
controls the number of DBs that can collude without inferring
the content of the query, should not have any impact on each
DB as they will always perform the same operations regardless
of the privacy level. However, since the results sent by DBs
could also be considered as a (t , ℓ)-Shamir secret sharing of the
retrieved record, when t increases, then the number of secret
shares required to recover the record increases which will result
in more computation for the SU when performing Lagrange
interpolation over higher degree-t polynomials.
We further study the impact of the number of byzantine
DBs on the processing time on SU side in LP -Goldberg as
depicted in Figure 8. As expected, having more byzantine DBs
will increase the complexity of decoding the different shares,
that SU receives from DBs, using the relatively expensive
HARDRECOVER subroutine from [33].
As for τ -LP -Goldberg , the τ -independence extension will
have no impact on the processing time of DBs and should
also have no impact on SU s as long as t + τ is constant. This
means that both PU s and SU s will always seek the maximum
privacy levels for their data and queries such that t + τ < k.
This is reflected in Figure 9. However the processing time will
be linear in t + τ similar to Figure 7a.
As for the case of mobile SU s, we compare the performance
of batching multiple queries for the future locations of a
SU to that of sending separate consecutive queries using
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Fig. 9: Performance of τ -independent LP -Goldberg , with k =
ℓ = 6 and t + τ < k
LP -Goldberg , SealPIRand,and XPIR as depicted in Figure 10.
Using batching mainly reduces the computation on DBs side
and will reduce the end-to-end delay for answering the queries
of the moving SU .
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We also demonstrate the benefit of relying on
RAID-LP -Chor and partitioning the database content
among DBs, instead of simply replicating it, on the DBs’
side for several values of the redundancy parameter π. As
expected, π = 2 yields the best performance however it also
offers the lowest level of resistance to collusion. Setting π
to be equal to ℓ will is equivalent to the original scheme
LP -Chor and will have the best performance. Therefore,
RAID-LP -Chor offers a performance-privacy tradeoff that
is controlled by the redundancy parameter π.
103 104 105 106
Number of records r
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
D
B 
pr
oc
es
sin
g 
tim
e 
(s)
RAID-PIR r=2
LP-Chor
RAID-PIR r=3
RAID-PIR r=4
Fig. 11: DB’s processing time under RAID-LP -Chor com-
pared to LP -Chor
In terms of communication overhead, most of the ap-
proaches, including ours, have linear cost in the number of
records in the database as shown in Table III. What really
makes a difference between these schemes’ communication
overheads is the associated constant factor which could be
very large for some protocols. Based on our experiment and
the expressions displayed in Table III, we plot in Fig. 12,
the communication overhead that the CRN experiences for
each private spectrum availability query issued by SU for the
different schemes. The scheme with the lowest communication
overhead is that of Troja et al. [19] especially for a large
number of records thanks to the use of Gentry et al. PIR [35]
which is the most communication efficient single-server proto-
col in the literature having a constant communication overhead.
However this scheme is computationally expensive just like
most of the existing cPIR-based approaches as we show
in Fig. 4. RAID-LP -Chor is the second best scheme in
terms of communication overhead followed byLP -Chor , but
they also provide information theoretic privacy. As shown in
Figure 12, RAID-LP -Chor is significantly more efficient than
LP -Chor , which again shows the benefit, in terms of overhead,
of distributing the spectrum availability information among
multiple DBs. As shown in Fig. 12, LP -Chor incurs much
lower communication overhead than LP -Goldberg thanks to
the simplicity of the underlying Chor PIR protocol. However,
as we discussed earlier, LP -Goldberg provides additional
security features compared to LP -Chor . SealPIR has a rel-
atively high communication overhead especially for smaller
database size but its overhead becomes comparable to that of
LP -Chor when the database’s size gets larger as shown in
Fig. 12. This could be a good alternative to the cPIR schemes
used in the context of CRN s especially that it introduces much
lower latency which is critical in the context of CRN s. Still,
the proposed approaches have better performance and also
provide information-theoretic privacy to SU s, which shows
their practicality in real world.
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V. RELATED WORK
There are other approaches that address the location pri-
vacy issue in database-driven CRN s. However, for the below
mentioned reasons we decided not to consider them in our
performance analysis. For instance, Zhang et al. [17] rely on
the concept of k-anonymity to make each SU queries DB by
sending a square cloak region that includes its actual location.
k-anonymity guarantees that SU ’s location is indistinguishable
among a set of k points. This could be achieved through the
use of dummy locations by generating k− 1 properly selected
dummy points, and performing k queries to DB , using the
real and dummy locations. Their approach relies on a tradeoff
between providing high location privacy level and maximizing
some utility. This makes it suffer from the fact that achieving
a high location privacy level results in a decrease in spectrum
utility. However, k-anonymity-based approaches cannot achieve
high location privacy without incurring substantial communi-
cation/computation overhead. Furthermore, it has been shown
in a recent study led by Sprint and Technicolor [25] that
anonymization based techniques are not efficient in providing
location privacy guarantees, and may even leak some location
information. Grissa et al [21], [54] propose an information
theoretic approach which could be considered as a variant
of the trivial PIR solution. They achieve this by using set-
membership probabilistic data structures/filters to compress
the content of the database and send it to SU which then
needs to try several combinations of channels and transmission
parameters to check their existence in the data structure.
However, LPDB is only suitable for situations where the
structure of the database is known to SU s which is not always
realistic. Also, LPDB relies on probabilistic data structures
which makes it prone to false positives that can lead to
erroneous spectrum availability decision and cause interference
to PU ’s transmission. Zhang et al. [20] rely on the ǫ-geo-
indistinguishability mechanism [55], derived from differential
privacy to protect bilateral location privacy of both PU s and
SU s, which is different from what we try to achieve in this
paper. This mechanism helps SU s obfuscate their location,
however, it introduces noise to SU ’s location which may
impact the accuracy of the spectrum availability information
retrieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, with the key observation that database-driven
CRN s contain multiple synchronized DBs having the same
content, we harnessed multi-server PIR techniques to achieve
an optimal location privacy for both SU s and PU s and for
different use cases with high efficiency. Our analytical and
experimental analysis indicates that our adaptation of multi-
server PIR for database-driven CRN s achieve magnitudes of
time faster end-to-end delay compared to the fastest state-
of-the-art single-server PIR adaptation with an information
theoretical privacy guarantee. Given the demonstrated benefits
of multi-server PIR approaches without incurring any extra
architectural overhead on database-driven CRN s, we hope this
work will provide an incentive for the research community
to consider this direction when designing location privacy
preservation protocols for CRN s.
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